Remick v. Manfredy by unknown
2001 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-25-2001 
Remick v. Manfredy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001 
Recommended Citation 
"Remick v. Manfredy" (2001). 2001 Decisions. 13. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/13 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2001 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed January 25, 2001 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-1422 
 
LLOYD Z. REMICK, ESQ., 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ANGEL MANFREDY; 
JOHN MANFREDY; 
JEFFREY H. BROWN, ESQ.; 
KATHLEEN H. KLAUS, ESQ.; 
D'ANCONA & PFLAUM 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 99-cv-00025) 
District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner 
 
Argued September 13, 2000 
 
Before: SLOVITER, SCIRICA and ALITO, Cir cuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 25, 2001) 
 
       Patrick C. Campbell, Jr. (Argued) 
       Richard G. Phillips Associates, P.C. 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103-7596 
 
        Attorney for Appellant 
 
 
  
       Louis C. Ricciardi 
       Rodriguez & Richards 
 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
       Lisa M. Sommer 
 
       Steven L. Baron (Argued) 
       D'Ancona & Pflaum 
       Chicago, IL 60601 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Lloyd Remick, an attorney specializing in sports 
and entertainment law licensed to practice in the 
 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, filed suit in a 
Pennsylvania state court against Angel Manfr edy 
("Manfredy"), John Manfredy, Jef frey Brown and Kathleen 
Klaus, as well as against the law firm D'Ancona & Pflaum 
with which Brown and Klaus are associated. The complaint 
 
alleges, inter alia, breach of contract, tortious interference 
with contract, misappropriation of image and likeness, civil 
conspiracy, and defamation.1 The defendants removed the 
action to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. 
 
The District Court dismissed the complaint against the 
individual defendants under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction 
and against the law firm under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim. See Remick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 452 
(E.D. Pa. 1999). This appeal raises a number of issues 
which we will consider seriatim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although Remick refers briefly to the dismissal of the remaining 
counts of the complaint, he provides no legal argument to support his 
contention that the District Court erred and we have found none. 
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I. 
 
FACTS 
 
According to the complaint, which we accept as true for 
purposes of a motion to dismiss, in late 1996 Remick and 
his associate, Bernard Resnick, wer e approached by 
Manfredy, a lightweight professional boxer , and his 
advisors, John Manfredy, his brother and agent, and 
Jeffrey Brown, an attorney with D'Ancona & Pflaum, about 
representing Angel Manfredy in negotiations, particularly 
with fight promoter Cedric Kushner Pr oductions, Ltd. 
("Kushner"). Eventually, Remick and Manfr edy entered into 
a contract under which Remick would act as Manfr edy's 
special counsel in the procurement and negotiation of high 
profile and lucrative fights, promotions and endorsements. 
Manfredy signed a fee agreement that entitled Remick to a 
specified percentage of all purses or other compensation 
which Manfredy received for boxing or pr omotions during 
the term of the agreement and of any endorsement contract 
procured by Remick on Manfredy's behalf.2 Manfredy and 
Brown had the right to review and appr ove or disapprove 
all contracts negotiated by Remick. On February 7, 1997, 
Remick was successful in negotiating for Manfr edy an 
Exclusive Promotional Agreement between Kushner and 
Manfredy. 
 
According to Remick, Manfredy quickly benefitted from 
his representation, and in the year following Remick's 
retention Remick had secured Manfr edy purses up to 
$375,000. In early 1998, there was a disagr eement between 
Remick and Manfredy over negotiations for an HBO- 
televised fight between Manfredy and Azumah Nelson, and 
ultimately the proposed Nelson fight fell thr ough. On March 
2, 1998, Manfredy sent Remick a letter ter minating his 
representation, asserting that Remick had failed to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The agreement provided Remick was to receive 5% of up to $35,000 of 
Manfredy's purse for the first bout ther eafter, 8% of the net amount of 
all purses or other compensation Manfredy r eceived for boxing or 
promotions thereafter during the ter m of the agreement, and 15% of the 
gross amount Manfredy received fr om any endorsements Remick 
procured for the boxer. 
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adequately represent Manfredy's inter ests by not delivering 
on certain alleged promises and faltering as a negotiator. 
The letter concludes with the following paragraphs: 
 
        When we began working together you led me to 
       believe that you had the ability and connections to 
       bring in endorsements and negotiate effectively with 
       [Kushner]. This hasn't happened. During the more 
       than thirteen months you represented me you never 
       delivered a single endorsement opportunity. 
 
        As a result of your failures to adequately represent 
       my interests, I have decided to terminate your 
       engagement. Please forward all of my files r elating to 
       my representation to my attorney, Jeffrey Brown, at 
       D'Ancona & Pflaum. 
 
App. at 119. 
 
Thereafter, Manfredy's team negotiated with Kushner for 
a bout against Isander Lacen to take place on June 16, 
1998, with a $75,000 purse. Remick claimed that he was 
entitled to an 8% share of Manfredy's purse because he 
negotiated the overarching Exclusive Pr omotional 
Agreement between Manfredy and Kushner . Remick asked 
Kushner to place 8% of Manfredy's purse into escrow until 
his dispute with Manfredy could be resolved, but Kushner 
did not do so. 
 
On September 2, 1998, Remick wrote to Manfr edy 
rejecting the termination of his r epresentation, demanding 
8% of Manfredy's purse from the Lacenfight, and stating 
that he would "be left with no recourse than to pursue legal 
remedies" unless Manfredy withdr ew his March 2, 1998 
termination letter. App. at 59-60. On September 11, 1998, 
defendant Kathleen Klaus, another attorney with D'Ancona 
& Pflaum, sent a letter to Remick stating: 
 
        We are writing in response to your letter of 
       September 2, 1998 threatening to take legal action 
       against our client Angel Manfredy. 
 
        As you know, Mr. Manfredy ter minated his 
       relationship with you by letter on March 2, 1998. His 
       letter made it very clear that, in light of your failure to 
       perform your obligations to him, he was left with no 
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       alternative other than to sever his association with 
       you. Your September 2, 1998 letter indicates that you 
       received Mr. Manfredy's letter six months ago and, 
       because you are an attorney, we assume you 
       appreciated its import. 
 
        We are not aware of any legal principle which allows 
       you to "reject" the termination of an attorney client 
       relationship or any authority which requir es one party 
       to the contract to perform in the face of the other 
       party's breach. If you insist on attempting to extort 
       money from Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. or any 
       other entity with which Mr. Manfredy is engaged on the 
       basis of your alleged contract with Mr. Manfr edy, we 
       will not hesitate to pursue our legal remedies, 
       including a suit for damages arising from your failure 
       to adequately represent Mr. Manfr edy. 
 
App. at 121. 
 
Remick's complaint in this case arose out of both the 
failed relationship with Manfredy and the Klaus letter. 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under both Rule 
12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) and an Alternative Motion to 
Transfer under Rule 17. The District Court granted the 
defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), 
concluding that there was no personal jurisdiction over the 
individual defendants. Focusing on the merits of the claims 
against the law firm, the District Court considered 
defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. It dismissed with 
prejudice Remick's defamation claim against D'Ancona & 
Pflaum, and dismissed (without prejudice) his claims for 
interference with business and contractual relationships 
(variously called, inter alia, inter ference with contracts) and 
civil conspiracy. Remick filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
II. 
 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
 
Although the order of the District Court dated April 22, 
1999, states that the complaint is dismissed without 
prejudice, in fact the Memorandum and Or der dated the 
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same day and filed contemporaneously holds that the 
complaint against the individuals is dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, that there is general personal 
jurisdiction over the law firm, and that one count of the 
complaint against the law firm, that for defamation, is 
dismissed with prejudice but that two counts against that 
defendant, the claims for tortious interfer ence with contract 
and for civil conspiracy, are dismissed with leave given to 
Remick to replead. He chose not to do so, instead filing the 
notice of appeal. 
 
Because of the procedural posture of the case, we asked 
Remick to comment at oral argument on our jurisdiction to 
hear this matter. In Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 
951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), this court, noting the 
general rule that an order dismissing a complaint without 
prejudice is not appealable, stated that "[o]nly if the 
plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to stand on 
his complaint does the order become final and appealable." 
 
Although generally a plaintiff who decides to stand on the 
complaint does so in the district court, see, e.g., In re 
Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 529-30 (3d Cir. 
1999); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d 
Cir. 1996), we have made clear that such a course, while 
preferable, is not always necessary. Recently, in Semerenko 
v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2000), the 
plaintiffs/appellants declared their intention to stand on 
their complaint in this court, and we thereafter treated the 
district court's order dismissing the complaint, albeit 
without prejudice, as a final order dismissing with 
prejudice and therefore appealable. 
 
During the argument in this case, Remick's attorney 
stated unequivocally that Remick wished to stand on his 
complaint. Accordingly, we conclude that we have 
jurisdiction over the dismissal as a final or der under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
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III. 
 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER 
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 
 
Remick does not deny that individual defendants 
Manfredy, John Manfredy, Brown, and Klaus are not 
residents of Pennsylvania. Manfredy is an Indiana resident, 
and the other defendants are residents of Illinois. Under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), a district court may assert personal 
jurisdiction "over non-resident defendants to the extent 
permissible under the law of the state wher e the district 
court sits." Pennzoil Prod. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 
F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 
Pennsylvania's long-arm statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 5322(b), authorizes Pennsylvania courts"to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the 
constitutional limits of the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment." Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l 
Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Due process requires that the defendant have "minimum 
contacts" in the forum state, and that the exer cise of 
jurisdiction comport with "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotations omitted). 
The Supreme Court has stated that "minimum contacts 
must have a basis in `some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.' " Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) 
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475 
(1985)). 
 
Personal jurisdiction may be exercised under two distinct 
theories, a defendant's general or claim-specific contacts 
with the forum. General jurisdiction is based upon the 
defendant's "continuous and systematic" contacts with the 
forum and exists even if the plaintiff 's cause of action 
arises from the defendant's non-forum r elated activities. 
See Vetrotex CertainTeed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prod. 
Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 n.3 (3d Cir . 1996) (citations omitted). 
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In contrast, specific jurisdiction is present only if the 
plaintiff 's cause of action arises out of a defendant's forum- 
related activities, such that the defendant" `should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court' " in that 
forum. Id. at 151 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 
 
The District Court found that it had general jurisdiction 
over the D'Ancona & Pflaum law firm, but that it did not 
have general jurisdiction over the individual defendants. 
Neither of these determinations has been questioned on 
appeal. Therefore, we confine our inquiry to whether the 
District Court can exercise specific jurisdiction over the 
individual defendants. 
 
Such a determination is claim specific because a 
conclusion that the District Court has personal jurisdiction 
over one of the defendants as to a particular claim asserted 
by Remick does not necessarily mean that it has personal 
jurisdiction over that same defendant as to Remick's other 
claims. See Gehling v. St. George's Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 
F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding personal jurisdiction over 
defendant in wrongful death action with r egard to 
fraudulent misrepresentation and emotional distress claims 
but not as to plaintiffs' negligence and br each of contract 
claims); see also Carteret Sav. Bank, F A v. Shushan, 954 
F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1992) (examining the issue of personal 
jurisdiction as to plaintiff 's fraud claim separately from 
plaintiff 's breach of fiduciary duty claim); Provident Nat'l 
Bank v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 
437 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing specific jurisdiction as 
present when "the particular cause of action sued upon 
arose from the defendant's activities within the forum 
state"). 
 
In holding that it did not have specific personal 
jurisdiction over the individual defendants, the District 
Court did not conduct a claim-specific analysis except as to 
the breach of contract claim. It may not be necessary to do 
so in every multiple claim case, but because ther e are 
different considerations in analyzing jurisdiction over 
contract claims and over certain tort claims, we believe 
such differentiation is requir ed here. 
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A. Specific Jurisdiction Over Manfr edy for Breach of 
Contract Claim 
 
Remick's claims against Angel Manfredy ar e breach of 
contract and the tort claims of defamation, civil conspiracy, 
and misappropriation of image and likeness. In determining 
jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim, we must 
consider the totality of the circumstances, including the 
location and character of the contract negotiations, the 
terms of the contract, and the parties' actual course of 
dealing. See Farino, 960 F.2d at 1223. 
 
The District Court based its decision that ther e was no 
jurisdiction over Manfredy on the breach of contract claim 
primarily on this court's decision in Vetrotex, where we held 
that the circumstances attending two supply agr eements 
did not support the district court's exercise of specific 
personal jurisdiction. 75 F.3d at 152. W e stated that 
" `informational communications in furtherance of [a 
contract between a resident and a nonresident] does [sic] 
not establish the purposeful activity necessary for a valid 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over [the nonr esident 
defendant].' " Id. (quoting Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & 
Assoc., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir . 1993)). Nevertheless, we 
expressly acknowledged that in many instances, personal 
jurisdiction can arise primarily from a nonr esident 
defendant's contract with a forum resident. In Vetrotex, we 
distinguished 
 
       other cases where jurisdiction over a nonr esident 
       defendant has been premised largely on the 
       defendant's contract with a resident of the forum state. 
       For instance, this is not a case where the defendant 
       solicited the contract or initiated the business 
       relationship leading up to the contract. Nor is this a 
       case where the defendant sent any payments to the 
       plaintiff in the forum state, or where the defendant 
       engaged in extensive post-sale contacts with the 
       plaintiff in the forum state. 
 
Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted). 
 
Remick's contract claim is comparable to those 
distinguished in Vetrotex. According to Remick's affidavit, 
Manfredy sought Remick out by placing a telephone call to 
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Remick's associate Resnick at their office in Philadelphia. 
This solicitation eventually resulted in the fee agreement 
between Remick and Manfredy, which Remick signed in, 
and Manfredy signed and returned to, Pennsylvania. The 
agreement noted that its formality was r equired by the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, suggesting 
that Manfredy was receiving the benefit of Pennsylvania law 
under the agreement. In addition, at least one payment was 
sent by Manfredy to Remick at his Philadelphia office. Most 
of the services performed by Remick on behalf of Manfredy 
were conducted at Remick's Philadelphia office, and 
Manfredy certainly should have expected as much as he 
knew that Remick's home office is in Philadelphia. 
 
Finally, there were repeated "informational 
communications" during the course of the contractual 
relationship between Manfredy and Remick with Remick at 
his Philadelphia office, including the final communication 
-- Manfredy's termination letter of Mar ch 2, 1998. See 
Grand Entm't Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 
476, 482 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Mail and telephone 
communications sent by the defendant into the forum may 
count toward the minimum contacts that support 
jurisdiction."). These facts as a whole involved more 
entangling contacts than the mere "infor mational 
communications" at issue in Vetr otex. 
 
Decisions in two other cases also support finding 
personal jurisdiction here. In Farino, we upheld jurisdiction 
over out-of-state defendants who had approached a 
Pennsylvania bank seeking to borrow money. W e quoted 
from the Supreme Court's decision in Burger King, where 
the Court commented that jurisdiction is proper where 
parties "reach out beyond one state and cr eate continuing 
relationships and obligations with citizens of another state." 
Farino, 960 F.2d at 1222 (quoting Bur ger King, 471 U.S. at 
473). Analogizing to that situation, we stated in Farino that 
by approaching the bank, the defendants "establish[ed] a 
business relationship with a Pennsylvania entity" and 
"knowingly created continuing obligations with a citizen of 
Pennsylvania." Id. at 1223. We commented that "[w]hen a 
defendant has received the benefits and pr otections of the 
forum's laws by engaging in business activities with a 
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forum resident, the courts have `consistently rejected the 
notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat 
personal jurisdiction there.' " Id.  at 1225 (quoting Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 476); see also Time Share Vacation Club 
v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 65-66 (3d Cir. 1984) 
("What is required . . . is actual evidence that, by entering 
into the contract, the particular defendant could foresee 
impact within Pennsylvania."). 
 
In a situation similar to that before us, in which a 
Virginia law firm sued a California attorney in Virginia to 
collect fees after the attorney had retained the law firm as 
co-counsel to assist him in a California case, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated: 
 
       [The defendant] initiated the relationship with [the 
       plaintiff], knowing that [the plaintif f] was a Virginia 
       lawyer who likely would do the requested work in 
       Virginia. [The defendant] contracted with [the plaintiff] 
       in Virginia, first by telephone and later in a writing that 
       [the plaintiff], as the last party to sign, executed in 
       Virginia. [The plaintiff] performed all of his duties 
       under the contract in Virginia. Finally, the parties 
       exchanged numerous telephone calls and written 
       communications. Few examples of transacting 
       business are more classic than [the defendant's] 
       decision to associate a Virginia lawfirm on a case and 
       his subsequent dealings with that firm. Because [the 
       defendant] transacted business in Vir ginia, and 
       because [the plaintiff 's] cause of action arose directly 
       from those activities, the Virginia long-arm statute is 
       satisfied. 
 
English & Smith v. Metzger, 901 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(footnote omitted). Significantly, Vir ginia's long-arm statute 
has been interpreted, like Pennsylvania's,"to extend 
jurisdiction to the extent permissible under the due process 
clause." Id. at 38. 
 
In light of the limiting language in Vetr otex, the factual 
distinctions between Vetrotex and the case at hand, and the 
decisions in Farino and English & Smith , we conclude that 
the District Court has personal jurisdiction over Manfredy 
for Remick's breach of contract claim and that the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in holding to the contrary. 
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B. Specific Jurisdiction over Individual Defendants for 
Defamation 
 
Remick asserts his defamation claim against all four 
individual defendants as well as the law fir m. Here we 
consider only whether there is jurisdiction against the 
individual defendants on this claim. 
 
Remick's defamation claim arises out of two letters, both 
sent to Remick with no copies showing any other 
Pennsylvania recipient. The first letter , dated March 2, 
1998, was from Manfredy to Remick ter minating his 
representation because of alleged br oken promises and 
failures as a negotiator. In his affidavit, Remick states that 
the letter was faxed to him and that, while it was sitting on 
the office fax machine, his daughter (who we assume was 
working in the office) and an office secr etary "picked up the 
letter and reviewed it." App. at 68. This, Remick contends, 
constituted publication in Pennsylvania. The complaint also 
alleges that the charges in the letter wer e published "in 
whole or in part" by Brown and John Manfr edy to "other 
members of the professional boxing community," including 
Kushner. App. at 95-96. The second letter , dated September 
11, 1998, was sent by Klaus to Remick and reiterated 
Manfredy's statements in the March 2nd letter that Remick 
was fired for inadequately representing Manfredy and urged 
him to stop "insist[ing] on attempting to extort money." 
App. at 121. Remick alleges that the letter and the charges 
therein were published and distributed"elsewhere into the 
boxing community." App. at 97. 
 
Remick argues that the District Court has specific 
personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants as to 
his defamation claim because the allegedly defamatory 
statements targeted a Pennsylvania resident's forum-related 
activities and were published in Pennsylvania. Remick 
relies on Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), where the 
Supreme Court set forth the "effects test" for determining 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who 
allegedly committed an intentional tort outside the forum. 
Calder involved an allegedly libelous National Enquirer 
article written and edited in Florida and published 
nationwide concerning the California activities of a 
California resident. Because the Califor nia resident was an 
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entertainer in Hollywood, the story had its gr eatest impact 
in California. The Court held that Califor nia had personal 
jurisdiction over the author and editor because the"effects" 
of their Florida conduct were chiefly felt in California, the 
state in which plaintiff lived and worked. See id. at 789. 
The Court emphasized that the alleged tort was not"mere 
untargeted negligence" but rather "intentional, and 
allegedly tortious, actions . . . expressly aimed at [the forum 
state]." Id. 
 
This court applied Calder in Imo Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert 
AG, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998), where we held that the 
Calder "effects test" requir es the plaintiff to show that: 
 
       (1) The defendant committed an intentional tort ; 
 
       (2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum 
       such that the forum can be said to be the focal point 
       of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that 
       tort; 
 
       (3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct 
       at the forum such that the forum can be said to be the 
       focal point of the tortious activity. 
 
Id. at 265-66 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
In Imo Industries, we held that New Jersey did not have 
personal jurisdiction over a German corporation for 
tortiously interfering with the plaintif f 's attempt to sell its 
Italian subsidiary to a French corporation because New 
Jersey, where the plaintiff 's headquarters was located, was 
not the focus of the dispute. We stated that"[s]imply 
asserting that the defendant knew that the plaintif f 's 
principal place of business was located in the forum would 
be insufficient in itself . . . . The defendant must manifest 
behavior intentionally targeted at and focused on the forum 
for Calder to be satisfied." Id.  at 265 (quotation omitted) 
(footnote omitted). We added that "the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant knew that the plaintiff would suffer the 
brunt of the harm caused by the tortious conduct in the 
forum, and point to specific activity indicating that the 
defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at the 
forum." Id. at 266. 
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Applying the three-part test of Imo Industries to this case, 
where the allegedly defamatory letters wer e written outside 
Pennsylvania, see Calder, 465 U.S. at 789 (finding that 
defamatory article written in Florida was "Florida conduct"), 
we conclude that Remick satisfies the first two parts. 
Defamation is an intentional tort and, because Remick's 
professional activities are center ed in Pennsylvania and the 
allegedly defamatory letters question Remick's pr ofessional 
ability, Remick may reasonably contend that he suffered 
the brunt of the harm in Pennsylvania. See Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984) (finding 
that individuals endure the bulk of har m from torts like 
defamation in their home states). 
 
However, we believe that Remick has not met the last 
requirement of Imo Industries. Remick argues that because 
two persons in his office read the Mar ch 2nd letter while it 
was on the fax machine, it was published in Pennsylvania 
and therefore the targeting r equirement was satisfied. At 
oral argument, he amplified that position, contending that 
such publication alone was sufficient to subject the sender 
to personal jurisdiction. We are not persuaded because it is 
clear from Remick's own affidavit that the two persons in 
his office read the March 2nd letter solely because it was 
lying on the fax machine. There is no indication that the 
letter was targeted at them or at anyone in Pennsylvania 
other than Remick. Cf. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785 (finding that 
600,000 copies of National Enquirer regularly sold in 
California). Therefore, this publication provides no basis for 
jurisdiction. 
 
According to Remick, the allegedly defamatory letters and 
the charges therein were published throughout the boxing 
community, not just in Philadelphia. Significantly, Remick 
has not asserted that Pennsylvania has a unique 
relationship with the boxing industry, as distinguished 
from the relationship in Calder between California and the 
motion picture industry, with which the Calder plaintiff was 
associated. See Imo Industries, 155 F .3d at 264 n.7. Even 
if the letter itself, other than merely the charges in the 
letter as the complaint alleges, were distributed or shared 
with other persons in the professional boxing community, 
such persons were apparently located thr oughout the 
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country. Unlike the defendants in Calder, whose national 
magazine is published in California mor e than any other 
state and whose story focused on California, see Calder 465 
U.S. at 788-89, it cannot be said that the defendants here 
expressly aimed their conduct at Pennsylvania so that 
Pennsylvania was the focal point of the tortious activity. 
The same analysis applies to the second letter . Therefore, 
the three-part test of Imo Industries was not met. It follows 
that the District Court did not err as a matter of law in 
holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
individual defendants with regard to Remick's defamation 
claim. 
 
C. Specific Jurisdiction over Angel and John Manfredy 
for Misappropriation of Image and Likeness 
 
For the same reason, we conclude that the District Court 
does not have specific jurisdiction over the Manfr edy 
brothers on Remick's misappropriation of image claim, a 
claim that Remick brings only against the two of them. 
That claim is based on the posting on Manfredy's old 
website without Remick's authorization of a single 
photograph of numerous persons that included Remick. 
The Calder "effects test" is clearly not satisfied. Given that 
the website was intended to provide infor mation on 
Manfredy and that it was accessible worldwide, there is no 
basis to conclude that the defendants expressly aimed their 
allegedly tortious activity at Pennsylvania knowing that 
harm was likely to be caused there. See Imo Industries, 155 
F.3d at 264 (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 
F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997)).3 Any resulting harm to 
Remick was merely incidental. Therefor e, we agree with the 
District Court's determination that it lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the Manfredy brothers on Remick's 
misappropriation of image and likeness claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The facts in this case do not requir e that we consider the current 
debate as to which fora have jurisdiction over a defendant who seeks to 
use its website for the solicitation of or transaction of business. The 
District Court summarized its view of the law in the area, in which it had 
concluded that the mere posting of infor mation or advertisements on an 
Internet website does not confer nationwide personal jurisdiction. See 
Remick, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 457. We do not disagree. 
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D. Specific Jurisdiction over John Manfr edy and Brown 
for Tortious Interference 
 
The final tort claim against individual defendants before 
us on appeal is Remick's claim against defendants John 
Manfredy and Brown for tortious inter ference with 
contractual relations, which the District Court dismissed 
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Remick alleges that John 
Manfredy and Brown, among other things,"set[ ] Remick up 
to fail in the negotiations over the Azumah Nelsonfight and 
. . . publish[ed] and disseminat[ed] false and defamatory 
information about Remick's skill and ability" with the intent 
"to interfere[ ] and cause harm" to Remick's contract with 
Manfredy. App. at 99. In his appellate brief, Remick claims 
that John Manfredy and Brown engaged in this activity so 
that Angel Manfredy would replace Remick with D'Ancona 
& Pflaum and Brown. See Br. of Appellant at 40-41. 
Tortious interference is an intentional tort, and therefore 
we must apply the Calder holding, as we did in Imo 
Industries, to determine the existence of personal 
jurisdiction. See 155 F.3d at 266-68. 
 
As we noted in discussing jurisdiction over the 
individuals on Remick's defamation claim, the brunt of the 
harm caused by the alleged intentional tort must 
necessarily have been felt by Remick in Pennsylvania, as 
his business practice is based in Philadelphia. Although we 
concluded there that Remick could not show the 
defendants expressly aimed their tortious conduct at 
Pennsylvania so that this forum can be viewed as the focal 
point of the tortious activity, Remick has mor e basis to 
support jurisdiction on this claim. Albeit a tort, it is 
necessarily related to the contract which he had entered 
into with Manfredy and which is the subject of the alleged 
tortious interference. Remick asserts in his affidavit that he 
conducted the majority of his negotiation, consultation, and 
advice services for Manfredy out of his Philadelphia office. 
App. at 68. Accepting that assertion as true, it follows that 
the effects of any intentional conduct by the defendants 
designed to interfere with Remick's contractual relations 
with Manfredy necessarily would have been felt in 
Pennsylvania. 
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Further, unlike the case in Imo Industries, where the 
German defendant's alleged tortious conduct appeared to 
have been expressly aimed at injuring a Fr ench company 
and not the in-forum plaintiff, in this case Brown and John 
Manfredy's alleged tortious conduct was expr essly aimed at 
injuring Remick in Pennsylvania where he lives and works. 
That is sufficient to satisfy both Calder and IMO Industries. 
Thus, we conclude that the District Court err ed as a matter 
of law in holding that it lacked specific jurisdiction over the 
individual defendants with respect to Remick's claim for 
tortious interference. 
 
IV. 
 
CLAIMS AGAINST THE LAW FIRM 
 
A. The Defamation Claim 
 
Although we conclude that the District Court does not 
have personal jurisdiction over Remick's defamation claim 
against the four individual defendants, we must r each the 
merits of that claim because the court dismissed the 
defamation claim against the law firm of D'Ancona & 
Pflaum over whom it admittedly had general jurisdiction.4 
That firm is claimed to be vicariously liable as the employer 
of both Brown and Klaus when Angel Manfr edy sent his 
letter to Remick dated March 2, 1998 and Klaus sent her 
letter dated September 11, 1998.5 The District Court held 
that Remick's complaint failed to state a claim of 
defamation. The sufficiency of Remick's pleading raises a 
question of law over which we have plenary r eview. See 
Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court noted the law firm's admission "that it has records 
of having serviced 54 clients in Pennsylvania, some of which are present 
clients." Remick, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 459. This led the court to conclude 
that the law firm "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting 
activities within this state to justify the exer cise of general personal 
jurisdiction over it." Id. 
 
5. Although Brown did not sign the Mar ch 2nd letter, the complaint 
makes the general assertion that this letter "was prepared by, and/or 
published and disseminated to, other members of the Manfredy team," 
which included Brown. App. at 95. 
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As the District Court recognized, to succeed on a claim 
for defamation under Pennsylvania law, a plaintif f must 
show, inter alia, a communication capable of having 
defamatory meaning. See Remick, 52 F . Supp. 2d at 460; 
see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8343(a)(1) (The plaintiff 
in a defamation case has the burden of pr oving the 
"defamatory character of the communication."). The trial 
court must determine as a matter of law whether the 
communication is capable of having defamatory meaning; if 
not, the claim should be dismissed. See Baker v. Lafayette 
College, 516 Pa. 291, 296, 532 A.2d 399, 402 (1987). 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, a statement is defamatory if it 
"tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him 
in the estimation of the community or to deter thir d 
persons from associating or dealing with him." Tucker v. 
Fischbein, No. 99-1139, slip op. at 9 (3d Cir . January 9, 
2001) (quoting Corabi v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 441 Pa. 432, 
442, 273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971)). In determining whether a 
communication is defamatory, the court must view the 
statement "in context" with an eye towar d "the effect the 
[statement] is fairly calculated to pr oduce, the impression it 
would naturally engender, in the minds of the average 
persons among whom it is intended to circulate." Baker, 
516 Pa. at 296, 532 A.2d at 402 (quoting Corabi , 441 Pa. 
at 447, 273 A.2d at 907). Viewing statements in their 
appropriate contexts, courts must deter mine whether they 
"tend[ ] to blacken a person's r eputation or to expose him to 
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to injure him in his 
business or profession." Corabi, 441 Pa. at 441, 273 A.2d 
at 904. 
 
The District Court focused on the September 11th letter 
and did not address whether Remick's defamation claim 
can be based on the March 2nd letter fr om Manfredy. 
Remick's complaint alleges that the March 2nd letter 
accused him of: (1) failing to adequately repr esent 
Manfredy's interests, (2) failing to r ecognize and discharge 
his obligations to Manfredy, (3) failing to live up to promises 
he had made to Manfredy, and (4) being an inef fective 
negotiator and attorney. 
 
Each of these statements expressed Manfr edy's subjective 
opinion. In Pennsylvania, an opinion cannot be defamatory 
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unless it "may reasonably be understood to imply the 
existence of undisclosed defamatory facts justifying the 
opinion." Baker, 516 Pa. at 297, 532 A.2d at 402 (emphasis 
added) (quotation omitted). In his March 2nd letter, 
Manfredy disclosed the factual basis behind each of his 
accusations. He noted five instances in which Remick failed 
to adequately represent his interests, including (1) Remick's 
business partner's refusal to convey a counter offer in 
negotiations for the possible Rueles fight, (2) Remick's 
failure to deliver a million-dollar purse following the Gatti 
fight, (3) Remick's failure to increase the purse for the Paez 
fight, (4) Remick's failure to increase the purse for the 
possible Nelson fight (although not referr ed to directly by 
name), and (5) Remick's failure to deliver a single 
endorsement opportunity through negotiations with 
Kushner. 
 
In light of the disclosure of these factual bases, the 
opinions set forth by Manfredy in his Mar ch 2nd letter 
cannot be considered defamatory. See Redco Corp. v. CBS, 
Inc., 758 F.2d 970, 972 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding opinion 
disclosing underlying facts not defamatory because"a 
listener may choose to accept or reject [the opinion] on the 
basis of an independent evaluation of the facts"); Parano v. 
O'Connor, 433 Pa. Super. 570, 575, 641 A.2d 607, 609 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994) (finding incapable of being defamatory 
comments that appellant was adversarial, less than helpful, 
and uncooperative because they were subjective opinions 
based upon disclosed facts). Rather, they ar e "frank 
opinion[s] void of innuendo." Baker, 516 Pa. at 297, 532 
A.2d at 402. 
 
As for Klaus' September 11th letter, Remick asserts that 
the following statement is defamatory: "If you insist on 
attempting to extort money . . . , we will not hesitate to 
pursue our legal remedies, including a suit for damages 
arising from your failure to adequately represent Mr. 
Manfredy." App. at 121 (emphasis added). The District 
Court, assuming publication to third parties, found the 
statement to be nothing "other than an expr ession of 
opinion and dissatisfaction with Mr. Remick's performance 
on Mr. Manfredy's behalf." Remick , 52 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
The court recognized that Remick might have found the 
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letter to be personally insulting, but it held that the letter 
was not capable of having defamatory meaning. 
 
At oral argument, Remick presented the Klaus letter as 
stating that if Remick "continue[s] to extort" money from 
Kushner, Klaus and Manfredy would not hesitate to pursue 
legal remedies (emphasis added). The language of the letter 
does not so state. Admittedly, the word "extort" is a strong 
one. In some contexts, when published to thir d parties not 
involved in the dispute, the statement that one person is 
extorting money from another has been viewed as 
defamatory under Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Frederick v. 
Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, 1994 WL 57213, at *11 (E.D. 
Pa. February 18, 1994) (finding statement that"accuses 
[plaintiff] with committing the crime of extortion" capable of 
being defamatory); Corabi, 441 Pa. at 447, 273 A.2d at 907 
(finding statements that "convey[ ] to the average reader 
imputations of involvement in or actual guilt of crimes 
involving moral turpitude" capable of being defamatory); 
Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa. Super. 422, 439, 536 A.2d 
1337, 1345 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding that "statements 
to the effect that an attorney has committed improper, 
illegal actions within the context of his practice, would tend 
to impugn his integrity, and thereby blacken his business 
reputation"); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Askinazi, 
2000 WL 964753, at *5 (E.D. Pa., July 12, 2000) (finding 
statement that plaintiff 's lawsuit was"a form of legalized 
blackmail" defamatory because it accused plaintif f of 
"improper professional conduct"); cf. Thomas Merton Ctr. v. 
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 497 Pa. 460, 466, 442 A.2d 213, 216 
(1981) (noting that "a publication is defamatory if it 
ascribes to another `conduct, character or a condition that 
would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of 
his lawful business, trade or profession' ") (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 573 (1977)). 
 
We believe this case differs fr om those, and that the 
Pennsylvania courts would agree. The September 11th 
letter was written in the context of two lawyers taking 
diametrically opposing legal positions. Moreover, Klaus was 
responding to Remick's September 2nd letter to Manfredy, 
in which he demanded that Manfredy revoke his 
termination letter and threatened to pursue legal remedies 
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of his own. Correspondence between jousting lawyers is not 
always drafted with the finesse, tact, and niceties used by 
a 19th century novelist, and, as we have previously stated, 
"[i]t is well settled that the use of catchy phrases or 
hyperbole does not necessarily render statements 
defamatory that would otherwise be non-actionable." Redco, 
758 F.2d at 972. In this instance, the use of the term 
"extort" is non-defamatory "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous 
epithet used by those who considered [plaintiff 's] 
negotiating position extremely unreasonable." Greenbelt 
Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) 
(finding "blackmail" accusation not defamatory because no 
reader could have thought that plaintif f was being charged 
"with the commission of a criminal offense"). 
 
While the letter from Klaus probably should have been 
toned down, and we encourage counsel to maintain civility 
in their correspondence with each other r egardless of the 
animosity between clients, the audience to which this 
statement was allegedly published knew that it ar ose from 
bitter attorney communications. 
 
In his complaint, Remick also alleges that Klaus' 
September 11th letter was defamatory because she accused 
him of "having committed professional malpractice." App. at 
97. Although Remick doesn't identify Klaus' specific 
comments in either his complaint or his affidavit, in her 
letter Klaus refers to Remick's "failur e to perform [his] 
obligations to [Manfredy]" and his"failure to adequately 
represent Mr. Manfredy." App. at 121. 
 
Significantly, Klaus stated in her letter that Manfredy's 
March 2nd letter made her assertions of pr ofessional 
failings "very clear." App. at 121. By reiterating and 
specifically incorporating Manfredy's earlier letter into her 
own letter, Klaus made known that any facts not disclosed 
in her letter were disclosed in the earlier letter. In light of 
the context in which this letter was written, Klaus' 
comments regarding Remick's professional competence 
would be viewed under Pennsylvania law as opinion and 
hence not defamatory. It follows that the District Court did 
not err in dismissing with prejudice Remick's claim for 
defamation against the law firm. 
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B. Claims of Tortious Interfer ence with Contract and 
Conspiracy 
 
Remick's remaining contention on appeal is that the 
District Court erred in dismissing his tortious interference 
with contract and conspiracy claims against D'Ancona & 
Pflaum. As noted earlier, the basis for Remick's tortious 
interference claim is that Brown, while associated with the 
law firm, "set [Remick] up to fail in negotiations by directing 
him to make outlandish demands for [the Nelson] bout that 
Angel Manfredy was not even physically capable of 
fighting." Br. of Appellant at 40. Remick's conspiracy claim 
is predicated on the tortious interfer ence claim. 
 
To set forth a viable cause of action for tortious 
interference with contract under Pennsylvania law, 
plaintiffs must plead the following elements: 
 
       (1) the existence of a contractual, or prospective 
       contractual relation between the complainant and a 
       third party; 
 
       (2) purposeful action on the part of the defendant, 
       specifically intended to harm the existing r elation, or to 
       prevent a prospective relation fr om occurring; 
 
       (3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part 
       of the defendant; and 
 
       (4) the occasioning of actual legal damage as a r esult of 
       the defendant's conduct. 
 
Pelagatti, 370 Pa. Super. at 434, 536 A.2d at 1343. 
 
The District Court dismissed Remick's tortious 
interference claim because it failed to r easonably inform the 
adverse party of the asserted cause of action, which the 
court deemed to be the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2). The court found Remick's complaint deficient 
because Remick did not "advise the defendant of how its 
employee allegedly `set up' the plaintiff to fail in fight 
negotiations and what false and defamatory infor mation 
[Brown] is accused of disseminating and to whom." Remick, 
52 F. Supp. 2d at 461. 
 
Although the District Court dismissed the tortious 
interference with contract claim and the conspiracy claim 
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with leave to replead, in dismissing the court imposed a 
pleading requirement beyond that r equired by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the still applicable system 
of notice pleading, all Remick was requir ed to do was 
provide "a short and plain statement of[his] claim showing 
that [he] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Remick 
satisfied this requirement, as he put the defendants on 
notice as to the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
tortious behavior. There are discovery mechanisms, such as 
interrogatories, for ascertaining more details regarding the 
complaint allegations. Therefore, we cannot affirm the 
District Court's dismissal of Remick's claims for tortious 
interference and conspiracy against D'Ancona & Pflaum. 
 
V. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will r everse the District 
Court's order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Remick's 
claim against Angel Manfredy for breach of contract and his 
claim against John Manfredy and Jeffr ey Brown for tortious 
interference with contractual relationships. In all other 
respects we will affirm the District Court's order dismissing 
the claims against the individual defendants. W e will affirm 
the dismissal with prejudice of Remick's claim against 
D'Ancona & Pflaum for defamation. We will r everse the 
order insofar as it dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) Remick's 
claims against the law firm for tortious interference with 
contract and conspiracy. On remand, the District Court 
may want to address promptly the defendants' alternative 
motion to transfer. Each party to bear its own costs. 
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